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During his tenure as the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, beginning in 1991, Boris Y. 
Nemtsov gained international renown as one of the most promising young reformers 
and a possible successor to President Yel'tsin. In 1997 he was summoned to the 
Kremlin to become deputy prime minister (and later first deputy prime minister) in Victor 
Chernomyrdin's government. After Sergei Kirienko became prime minister, Boris 
Yefimovich continued in his post, concentrating on curbing monopoly power and 
supervising the ceremonial funeral of Nikolai II. He resigned his government position in 
the aftermath of the ruble devaluation last August and went on to organize the coalition 
called "Just Cause," which unites several democratic parties for the upcoming Duma 
elections. Susan Cavan and I met with Boris Yefimovich on February 8. We appreciate 
the courtesy of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies in facilitating this 
interview. -- ML
Miriam Lanskoy: When you first entered the government you referred to yourself as a 
"kamikaze." That was a term Gaidar used in '92 as well. What did you mean, that you 
would be swallowed up in intrigue or that your measures would prove unpopular?
Boris Nemtsov: I had never been a bureaucrat before. I was elected every time -- three 
times -- to my previous positions. I had some ideas what Moscow's corridors of power 
would mean. I didn't know of any examples of persons who spent some time in the 
White House in Moscow [and] who became more popular than they were before the 
appointment. If you are popular before Yel'tsin puts you in the White House, you 
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immediately become unpopular. If you are intelligent, your popularity will grow and then 
go down. If not, it will happen immediately. That's why I used this term, "kamikaze." 
Second, I didn't know about the underground scene inside the White House. When I 
was in Nizhny Novgorod I believed that I knew, but I was mistaken, I did not know. I did 
not understand what kind of pressure needed to be put on Yel'tsin, on Chernomyrdin, 
and other persons [to accomplish one's objectives]. I did not know what kind of 
treatment you would receive if you did something wrong, for example from the oligarchs' 
point of view. I couldn't even estimate the number of conflicts on the inside.
I feel, generally, that it is not so easy to be in Moscow for a long time and to do 
something to stop some of the corrupt practices. And that's what we did. My first real 
accomplishment was to alter the distribution of contracts among suppliers to the 
government.
I instituted a system where public officials had to make full public disclosure of their 
property and finances. 
Susan Cavan: But only a few officials actually did that.
BN: No, thousands and thousands did: everybody except Luzhkov.
SC: Was anyone ever investigated?
BN: Sometimes, yes. You know this is not so bad. I knew there would be wrong 
information -- bureaucrats are not so afraid about such things. They would try to find 
some opportunity to overcome this difficulty. Finally the independent press tried to 
investigate. Not everyone tried, but those who were interested, like Berezovsky, tried to 
investigate this more carefully and found a lot of things. 
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This is very important. This [trend toward disclosure] is impossible to stop. How can you 
issue a decree now to abolish the financial disclosure? How would you explain that to 
the public? We started it and it's impossible to stop. If you have some elements of 
democracy, it is impossible to reverse this.
Power Struggles
SC: What is the role of public opinion now?
BN: Russia has independent mass media. What does it mean in Russia? There are 
several groups, for example, the MOST-Media group, the Berezovsky group, the 
Alekperov group, the Potanin group, the Luzhkov group and then some independent 
papers, like Kommersant. (1) They have different views on the same subject. And this is 
really the independence of the press. But, within a group there is no independence. 
Within a group there is strong control and discipline, like under the communist system. 
Fortunately we have several groups and there is no monopoly in this area. Primakov 
tries to control everything -- he's Soviet. (2) He is intelligent, experienced, but Soviet. He 
wants to control everything. But it's not so easy. For example he came to agreement 
with Vyakhirev and Gusinsky, but he has no idea how to find compromise with 
Berezovsky.
ML: Primakov seems to have become more powerful in recent months while 
Berezovsky's influence has declined. How did that come about?
BN: There are several rumors about the resignation of the prosecutor, Yuri Skuratov, 
last week.(3) One of the quite realistic explanations is that this is the result of 
Berezovsky's influence.
What is the source of Berezovsky's power? There is only one source -- he has two, but 
the most influential is the First Channel (ORT). He always uses ORT for his political 
purposes, for blackmail. If he wants to press me, [present] me with specific views or 
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demands, there will be a Sergei Dosenko special on [the issue]. I don't think he is weak 
now, because he has another source of power, his relationship with some people in the 
Kremlin, like Yel'tsin's daughter [Tatiana Dyachenko]. That's why I don't think that 
Berezovsky will decline.
ML: The explanation for extensive presidential power has been the need to push 
through reform. But now Primakov has that power ...
BN: Can you give me examples of his strong power, examples of Primakov's power?
ML: He's chairing a meeting of the Security Council and they're expected to approve...
BN: No! Never! Never! He will be fired immediately after that. His "treaty" will be 
neglected tomorrow. Forget about that! I know that -- I looked into this very carefully. 
Yel'tsin is very envious about anyone in the world who wants to cut his power, his own 
power. There are three parts to Primakov's "treaty." First, the Duma has to stop the 
impeachment process. Second, Yel'tsin will not dismiss the State Duma. Third, Yel'tsin 
has no chance to fire the government. One is nothing for Yel'tsin, because to organize 
impeachment is very complicated in Russia. Second, to dismiss Duma -- he's not 
worried about that. But the third part, when Primakov suggests to Yel'tsin 'don't fire me,' 
that is impossible. Yel'tsin was so angry about that. Believe me; look at tomorrow's 
news. The treaty will be about the first two parts. The third: Never.
SC: There were reports on Friday that Yel'tsin agreed to it at the Security Council 
meeting.
BN: To what?
SC: The Primakov proposal.
BN: No, what kind of proposal ... the third one ?
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SC: Yes.
BN: Don't fire the government ...
SC: All of them are in place until the next Duma elections.(4)
BN: This is another story. (Laughter) Let me explain. The Primakov treaty had a very 
important chapter, that Yel'tsin can't touch Primakov until the next presidential election. 
This is not the same. Now he can read, "don't touch the bulk of the government until the 
Duma election." That's a great idea. I totally agree. Because you know Primakov 
organized a very stupid economic policy this year; to organize barter, to forget about 
cash flow into the budget, and to print a huge amount of money. It is his responsibility, 
what has happened with the Russian economy during these few months. I absolutely 
agree with Yel'tsin. What is absolutely unbelievable, and what is not going to happen, is 
Yel'tsin agreeing not to touch Primakov up to 2000. That's another story you know. 
I think that Yel'tsin has a chance to appoint his own successor. This is his chance. He 
will try to use it. He will appoint a new prime minister and the new prime minister will be 
his successor. This is Yel'tsin's view -- I know him.
ML: Who would that person be?
BN: I know who it is not. (Laughter) Luzhkov it's not.
ML: Not Luzhkov ...
BN: Primakov, maybe, but he is not so lucky... maybe. There will not be too many 
choices. This is the main thing now. The main struggle for the next few months will be 
over who will be appointed prime minister after the Duma elections. This is the main 
challenge for Russia.
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Disunity Among Democrats
ML: Let's talk about the Duma elections. It seems that the Democrats have the best 
chance against the Communists if they are united. Why did you unite into a coalition of 
parties rather than as a party?
BN: Well, it doesn't matter for the election; under Russian laws, if you have a coalition, 
you also have a united list. The same thing happens [with a coalition as] with a party. 
So, it doesn't matter. To organize a united party is a very complicated task because we 
have a lot of small parties who believe that people will love their courage. If you tell 
them "forget about your supporters, let's organize some united party," it would take a lot 
of time, a lot of discussion, a lot of trouble, and maybe some of the parties you ask will 
never want to be together. But the coalition is enough to take part [in the Duma election] 
as a united team.
The problem is not whether we run as a coalition or as a party. The problem is what will 
happen with Yavlinsky and what will happen with "Our Home is Russia." We have our 
coalition, "Just Cause." My view is that, to win, we have to play together. Yavlinsky's 
view: Never.
ML: Why is that?
BN: "I'm the leader. I'm great and people love me and that's why I'll be on my own 
forever" -- this is his view. This may be a bit primitive way of putting it, but generally this 
is his view.
ML: Is that because Gusinsky will support him with money?
BN: Not money. Prospects, opportunities to have some use of TV and regional 
branches. Gusinsky has a lot of regional branches, not only nationwide, but regional 
branches. This is important. 
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Another explanation for Yavlinsky is that he doesn't want to have anything to do with 
these guys who were in the government, who are responsible for reform. That's why he 
is absolutely against Gaidar and Chubais. Their popularity is low -- that is true. What is 
strange for me is that he is against Kirienko. This is strange. The intelligentsia in Russia, 
the elite, has two problems with Yavlinsky. First, he will never be responsible for 
anything. He is in opposition to everything and he has no concrete task in his life. 
Second, he has no ideas on how to organize coalitions. People are nervous about that. 
I think that Yavlinsky needs us more than we need him. But he's against this. Then if we 
will join them, I will [bring in] more votes. I am a symbol of democratic reform -- but there 
is no movement from him in that direction. 
ML: He was here in December and I asked him whether he would cooperate with your 
coalition. He said he invited all of you into YABLOKO. (5)
BN: I'll explain to you how he did it. It's a funny story. He said, "We won't let you into 
YABLOKO right away. First you have to be a candidate member for five years." This is 
very offensive. Who is he that I should be his candidate? He worked under me in Nizhny 
Novgorod. When he proclaimed the idea that, "Boris, you can be a member after four 
years" -- this is impossible. Maybe, this is for you, so he can explain "I invited [Nemtsov] 
to be a member of YABLOKO, but he refused." If he had said, "Let's organize a coalition 
and YABLOKO will be our symbol," that would be different.
ML: Well, what are you going to do about it?
BN: This is a bad joke -- candidate for four years. Probably, he is afraid about his 
leadership. I'm not.
ML: Your coalition, then, does it have a regional structure?
BN: We have the coalition in 20 regions now. But the main task for me, especially for 
me, is to define it structurally, with different members taking the responsibility for 
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different sections of the country. I'm responsible in the Volga region and some Siberian 
regions like Krasnoyarsk krai and so on. The main task is to organize the structure of 
the coalition.
SC: When you said 20 regions, did you mean that the governors or members of the 
legislative council are in line?
BN: It's funny: Officials are not against us. Maybe they're afraid of Chubais because he 
is chief of our electricity system,(6) or maybe there is another reason. I don't know. They 
are always very pleased to meet us. They are concerned about our public support. 
Deputies from regional parliaments, they support us a lot; especially managers and new 
business representatives. 
SC: I hate to press the point: When you say they support you, do you mean that you 
have an office there with staff, or is it just that you've heard from people...
BN: No, we have a much easier way of feeling their support: Governor TV. The 
governor goes on a TV show about my visit to his region. "Governor TV" means regional 
TV stations. If they show "Boris met with the governor, they discussed this, this, and 
this. Then Boris gave a lecture at the university" -- without any argument or discussion -- 
this means I have their support. Offices don't really matter to us. TV is really the main 
issue.
Decision Makers
ML: How powerful is the Security Council and to what extent does that power depend 
upon who is SC secretary? It seems that when Skokov was there it was very powerful 
and since then it declined ...
BN: Unfortunately there is no legal foundation for the Security Council; that's why 
everything depends upon personal politics and the personal position of the Security 
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Council secretary. Lebed was very powerful. That's why the council was powerful at that 
time. Lebed was involved in the Chechnya war and the peace treaty, and after that he 
was fired. Rybkin had no political connection -- he was weak. That's why the council 
was weak. There is no legislation about the Security Council. The only thing we have is 
the constitution, which suggests the existence of such organization inside the Kremlin. 
But there is not a law -- I think this is a problem. It all depends on underground 
relationship with Yel'tsin, Tatiana, Yumashev and Bordyuzha.(7)
SC: That is an interesting point. Bordyuzha is both chief of staff and head of the Security 
Council. Doesn't that give him significant power?
BN: Yes, but it's not enough. You have to be a political leader and this is a problem -- to 
be a political leader and to stay in the Kremlin. If you are not Yel'tsin, this is impossible.
SC: Some people manage it for awhile.
BN: Can you give me an example? I know of only one -- Lebed.
SC: Filatov.(8)
BN: No. He wasn't a political leader.
ML: Primakov.
BN: I mean Secretary of Security Council. Bordyuzha does have much more power than 
before. That's true, but that's not enough to solve big questions like resolutions of the 
government, appointments for very important positions...
SC: Do you have any idea why Yumashev was dismissed?
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BN: Today Yel'tsin is at the funeral [for King Hussein of Jordan]. He went because he 
wants to show the world that he's powerful, he's in good shape. I have my own view: 
Maybe it's just a joke. I think that when he was in the hospital, he read the newspaper 
and noticed that he had no power, that nobody paid any attention to him. Life was going 
in one direction and Yel'tsin was staying in another hospital. Well, I think that he was so 
angry about that he wanted to prove to the nation that he's a Russian tsar. How to prove 
it? Fire somebody. If you fire some very small bureaucrat nobody will notice. It was 
impossible to fire Primakov or somebody in his government. What other choice did he 
have? To fire Dyachenko? That's why his choice was his chief [of staff]. This is my 
explanation, maybe it's not true, but ...(laughter)
ML: Let's look at some other instances of firing. When Chernomyrdin was fired in March 
'98, what was the run-up? Were you involved in the decision making?
BN: I was not. Chernomyrdin made several very important mistakes. His first mistake 
was when he reduced our power, I mean Chubais and myself. When we got into office 
we did very efficient things. We reduced the inflation rate; there was GDP growth, rate 
of incomes for people increased in that year; foreign investment tripled; the situation in 
industry improved dramatically. In the end of '97, Chernomyrdin was so afraid of the 
powerful assistants that he decided to reduce our powers. And he did. He said "I am 
responsible for the energy sector, I am responsible for this, this and this, and that."
ML: What led up to his firing?
BN: Yel'tsin was sick, like every time. In the middle of January when we took a 
helicopter ride, Yel'tsin said to me "Boris, what is happening with Chernomyrdin? Does 
he need more power, that he takes power from Chubais and Nemtsov?" Yes, he did 
[take power away from us]. But this was his mistake because he had no idea how to 
cooperate with the government. We had all the power. He [Chernomyrdin ] would be 
responsible...for salaries, payments, whatever. 
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His second mistake occurred in the United States when he met with Al Gore and said 
"you and me, we'll define the future of our great nations in the 21st century." 
Unbelievable! Unbelievably stupid! Of course, Yel'tsin was shocked by this move. But I 
was not involved in this. Early in the morning I was driving my car from the country, it 
was a Monday, and Chubais called me in the car and said "Boris!" he was so excited 
about this news, he said "Boris! I was fired just now! A few minutes ago! But you're still 
in the government, we'll meet now in your office." (Laughs) I had no idea about his 
resignation, really.
SC: What about the appointment of Sergei Kirienko?
BN: Well that's a funny story about the appointment of Kirienko. I saw Kirienko the day 
before that, it was Sunday. He was my deputy, as the Minister for Fuel and Energy. He 
is my guy, but if he had known about his new appointment I would have noticed. He said 
nothing. We discussed some very interesting things about the Unified Energy System, 
but he did not know, I'm sure. Early the [next] morning he was invited to Yel'tsin's office.
SC: But who would have selected Kirienko? I mean, did Yel'tsin know enough about 
everyone in the government to be able to say "Kirienko is the one I want"?
BN: Yel'tsin saw Kirienko three times before. One time -- the 10th of March, as far as I 
know -- I think it was in March, I was in Germany and Kirienko called me and asked 
what kind of behavior was required of him when meeting with Yel'tsin. Well, because I've 
known Yel'tsin for about eight years, I gave him some advice about that. Up until then, 
there had been no connection. I think that it was some discussion between Yumashev, 
Dyachenko, Berezovsky, and some other oligarchs, maybe Chubais. The discussion 
started in the middle of '97 about appointing a new chairman of the government, but this 
was only talk.
SC: In March was there any awareness of what was coming down the road -- the 
possible devaluation?
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BN: We had a political task at that time: to get support from the State Duma. As far as 
the financial situation is concerned, we paid more attention to the stability of the 
[domestic indicators]. By then it was too late; from my point of view we had to devalue 
the domestic currency by the end of '97, immediately after the Indonesian and South 
Korean crises.
ML: Is it possible that Kirienko was set up to take the blame for the economic crisis?
BN: No, I don't think so. I don't think that Russian bureaucrats are so clever. Nobody 
had any ideas about the financial crisis. The first time we discussed that was in the end 
of April with [US Deputy Treasury Secretary] Larry Summers and [US Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs] David Lipton. They came by my office 
and we discussed, not exactly devaluation, but the financial situation in the country, the 
domestic and international debt, and general aspects of economy. Larry told me at that 
time that the eastern crisis could affect the Russian economy deeply and we would 
have to prepare something to defend against it.
SC: During April, before the actual confirmation, was the government not meeting?
BN: No, no, we met. But when you have one task -- to get through the State Duma -- 
you have to concentrate on that task. There were a lot of meetings, a lot of discussions, 
but none of that really counted. It's obvious. It's impossible to do two serious things at 
the same time. You have to be concentrating on the subject. If you already know in 
general what's happening in the economy, you can pick up on what is going on, but you 
have to talk all the time to Zyuganov, to Yavlinsky, and with others. And it's funny -- 
Yavlinsky was against us -- 100% against us.
SC: He supported Primakov.
BN: No, no. He was against us. Absolutely, 100%. Without any explanation.
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SC: You had access to Yel'tsin, but didn't other ministers have to go through someone to 
get access to Yel'tsin?
BN: Yes, yes. For one year. From March '97 to March '98. After that no, there was no 
connection. Maybe also during the funeral days.
SC: What's the connection between the presidential apparat and the government in 
decision making?
BN: It depends on the personal relationship between Yel'tsin's chief of administration 
and the prime minister. This is absolutely an apparatchik problem. For example, when 
Kirienko was appointed, he insisted that Yumashev give him more freedom to deal with 
economic questions. A special decision from the president's office determined how 
decrees should be prepared and how such decisions would go through the system, the 
Kremlin administration. It was a very important decision and we simplified the system 
dramatically. Chernomyrdin's office would have to wait months for an important decree; 
with Kirienko, two days was enough.
SC: In the Chernomyrdin government a decree traveled first to the chief of staff and 
then...?
BN: When we were working in the Chernomyrdin government, we prepared the 
decrees. In the Kirienko government we did the same. But Chubais told me before that 
some decrees were prepared in the Kremlin administration, including economic ones.
SC: When Chubais was chief of staff?
BN: He was hmm maybe at that time. I don't know exactly about that. Good question.
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International Issues
ML: The last question is on foreign policy. Sometimes there is such an obvious 
difference between the Democrats and the Nationalists and Communists in the 
domestic issues, like the budget. The difference in foreign policy is not always so 
obvious. 
BN: Yes.
ML: Is there a difference? 
BN: Well, we have some differences and some similar positions. We are against "NATO 
expansion." I think this is really a very terrible decision from the NATO organization 
because Russia appears to be only a small part of the international world. If you occupy 
the boundaries of Russia with some organization, it looks like Russia is not part of the 
economy, not a part of European peace, not part of international [peace].(9) This is my 
explanation. The Communists' explanation is that NATO is our enemy that wants to 
destroy the country. Nonetheless, both of us are against NATO expansion. 
As far as Iraq, we have another position. We are against Hussein very much, and of 
course, the Communists support Hussein. But we are against the American position, not 
because we support Hussein, we are against him. But this is very artificial. America 
organized a very strong alliance of United Nations members around Hussein. He has 
become a hero once again. You don't destroy Hussein! You do nothing! You organized 
very strong support for this gentleman. 
ML: Would you support an all-out US effort to destroy Hussein?
BN: Well, that's better. Frankly, that's better. That's better than bombing Iraq and nothing 
happening. 
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ML: How about Iran?
BN: I think we have a similar position with the Communists. We are for cooperation with 
Iran but we are against the distribution or sale of nuclear weapons that the Communists 
support. For example, the US State Department insists that we stop any relationship 
with Iran. This is stupid. This is business: Iran has a lot of oil resources, for example, our 
oil companies want to invest money in Iran to take out oil. We are for competition. We 
regret that the American government is against American business. They forbid 
American companies to invest money. To produce oil -- not nuclear weapons, but oil. I 
have my own position: To invest money in Iran -- I support that. As I explained to the 
State Department, "you are not a planning committee." We are for competition and the 
private sector. I told Strobe Talbot about that several times. We are against nuclear 
weapons distribution -- this is true, but this is business
SC: I just wonder, with Iran having all that oil, why do they need a nuclear reactor?
BN: They started to build this reactor ten years ago. It's a long story. We have to finish 
it, not because it's right, but because if we stop, there will be an exorbitant penalty for 
the Russian economy. We would have to pay a huge amount of money if we stop. It's in 
the contract. Who will give us money? We are not so wealthy, like the United States. 
That's why we have to finish it. SC: It's a Soviet contract?
BN: Yes, of course. Everybody knows. The State Department guys know about that, but 
they say "stop it." What does it mean, "stop it"? Give us money and we will stop 
everything.(10)
ML: What is the difference with the Communists on the policy towards the "Near 
Abroad?"
BN: I'll give a more interesting example: Belarussia. Our new position is that we are for 
unification with Belarussia but it has to be a region of the Russian Federation. 
15
Lukashenka would not be a president, but instead a governor or a member of our 
parliament. We would stop the Belarussian Central Bank immediately. Their central 
bank becomes only a branch of the Moscow central bank, we have a united customs 
administration with its chief in Moscow. And Lukashenka would be like [Tatarstan 
President Mintimer] Shaimiev. We will implement a democracy to this country, publish 
newspapers, stop prohibitions on propaganda, including anti-Lukashenka propaganda. 
We want unification, Slavic people want to be together, but without stupid decisions 
from Mr. Lukashenka. He has to forget about his independence, that is our position. The 
Communists are for unification, but only in words, because they are afraid of 
Lukashenka as a political competitor. They are of the same type. That's why we are for 
unification and they are against.
SC: Are there any other states, besides Belarus, with which you want to unify?
BN: No. I don't think so. I'm not that stupid. 
Notes:
(1) Each of the most powerful "oligarchs" is associated with a set of media holdings. The 
state-run media under Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov include television channels 
(RTR and 51% of ORT), the wire services ITAR-TASS and RIA Novosti, and several 
radio stations and newspapers. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov controls the city-owned 
local television and cable channels and is influential with some Moscow papers. In 
addition to the major newspapers, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Ogonek, and Novye izvestia, 
Boris Berezovsky, the president of LogoVAZ, controls the board of ORT and, through 
one of his companies, owns 38% of ORT shares. Vladimir Gusinsky of the MOST Bank 
and allied MOST Media group boasts the private television station NTV and Radio Ekho 
Moskvy. The newspapers Izvestia and Komsomol'skaya pravda are associated with 
Vladimir Potanin, president of Oneximbank. Gazprom Chairman Rem Vyakhirev has 
some influence over NTV and several newspapers. Due to his status as president of 
LUKoil, Vagit Alekperov has some influence with the new television network REN and 
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the newspaper Izvestia. See Floriana Fossato and Anna Kachkaeva, "Russian Media 
Empires IV" on the RFE/RL web site at www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia4/index.html.
(2) In January and early February Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov attempted to gain 
personal control of the major state-owned media by appointing his KGB cronies to top 
positions. Former information chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Yuri 
Kobaladze, was made first deputy chairman of ITAR-TASS and deputy chairman of the 
holding company that controls the RTR television network. Primakov also named SVR 
officer Lev Koshelev to be in charge of RTR's Vesti news program. SVR officer Igor 
Amvrosov was appointed to run Radio Russia. See Russia Reform Monitor, No. 579, 27 
January 1999.
(3) It is widely believed that Boris Berezovsky used his influence to obtain Yuri 
Skuratov's resignation in retaliation for a raid on the offices of Berezovsky's company 
Sibneft. -- ML
(4) What exactly was agreed to at the 5 February Security Council meeting remains 
unclear. According to some reports, the president agreed to keep the government in 
place until the next Duma elections while others suggest he merely agreed to consult 
with the other branches before removing the government. See Susan Cavan's analysis, 
Editorial Digest, Vol. IV, No. 3, 15 February 1999, on ISCIP's web site at www.bu.edu/
iscip/news.html. On 25 February, Yel'tsin promised to keep Primakov as prime minister 
until the presidential elections in 2000. The following week, the Primakov-Berezovsky 
power struggle appeared to be tilting in Primakov's favor. On 4 March, Yel'tsin, as 
chairman of the CIS Council of Heads of State, unilaterally fired Berezovsky from his 
position as CIS executive secretary. -- ML 
(5) Grigory Yavlinsky spoke at the Kennedy School of Government on 14 December 
1998. In response to my question about the need for unity among the Democrats, he 
said that he would welcome the members of Just Cause into YABLOKO and in the 
event of electoral success they would share the Duma seats and cabinet portfolios. He 
17
later went on to say that there was no danger of splitting the democratic vote, because 
Just Cause lacks a substantial following. The only people who will vote for them, he 
said, are "their wives." The last word, so far, belongs to Boris Nemtsov, who told his 
Davis Center audience on 12 February that "Yavlinsky's wife will vote for me." -- ML
(6) After he left the post of first deputy prime minister in March 1998, Anatoly Chubais 
became chairman of the board of Unified Energy System, the Russian electricity 
monopoly. -- ML
(7) Yuri Skokov, secretary of the Security Council from May 1992 to May 1993; 
Aleksandr Lebed, secretary of the Security Council from June to October 1996; Ivan 
Rybkin, secretary of the Security Council from October 1996 to March 1998. Nikolai 
Bordyuzha was appointed secretary of the Security Council in September 1998; in 
December 1998 he replaced Valentin Yumashev as the president's chief of staff. 
(8) Sergei Filatov was Yel'tsin's chief of staff from January 1993 to July 1996. 
(9) This, of course, is a gross exaggeration: NATO is not about to "occupy" Russia's 
borders. Of the three newest NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, only Poland is contiguous with Russia, and that is a border with the Russian 
militarized exclave of Kaliningrad, which is separated from the rest of Russia by 
Lithuania and Belarus. -- ML 
(10) Russian military analysts, like Pavel Felgenhauer, give an entirely different 
explanation. Thus, the latter has written that the purpose of Russian cooperation with 
Iran was to oppose the United States in the Persian Gulf. See Pavel Felgenhauer, 
"Defense Dossier: The Arms Bazaar Beckons,"The Moscow Times, 24 September 1998.
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